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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * * *
VIRGIL H. CAMP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Civil No. 15,672

DESERET MUTUAL BENEFIT
ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for a breach of an insurance contract and an
interpretation of certain contract provisions.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was heard by the District Court on Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment.

From a judgment in favor of the defendant, plain-

tiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in his
favor as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case were stipulated to by counsel at the trial
of this matter.

The question before the trial court was simply an

interpretation of a contract provision.
On June 21, 1976, the Plaintiff's 16-year old son, Jeff Camp, was
severly injured on a trampoline.

3

~11adr2plegic.

He is, as a result of the accident,

(Escobar Depo. at 5)
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From June 21, 1976 to July 8, 1976, Jeff was in the Cottonwood
Hospital.

From July 8th to October 15, 1976 Jeff was in the Uni-

versity of Utah Medical Center in its physical rehabilitation secti~
under the care and supervision of Dr. Pedro Escobar.

(Escobar Depo.

5 and exhibits attached thereto)
On October 15, 1976, Jeff was released to go home with his
parents and family.

At the time of his discharge, he was given

certain prescriptions for medication, a course of physical therapy
with appointments to see his physicians,

(see discharge summary

attached to Dr. Escobar's Deposition) and prescriptions for medical
equipment:

a wheelchair, a specially-equipped van, a hospital bed,a

commode chair and a bath shelf (See Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibits
C, D,

B,

and E).
Mr. Virgil Camp, the plaintiff, obtained all of these items

prescribed and recommended by the attending physician.

He then

submitted them to the defendant for payment pursuant to his policy
insurance.

o:

(Camp Depo. at 15-18)

The defendant insurance company paid for all of the items prescribed and recommended except for the specially-equipped van.

The

defendant denied payment on the ground that it was not medical equip·
ment.

(Stewart Depo. at 11).

The van was equipped with special equi:'

ment prescribed and recommended by Jeff 1 s attending physician in oriE'
to alleviate his physical impairment -- that of a quadriplegic.
van contained the following:

~~

a refrigeration system to reduce bo~

temperature, a citizen 1 s band radio in order to comm,_micate with
others in the event of an emergency, a hydraulic lift, which would
transport the boy in his wheelchair from the ground l~~el into the~
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and forward to the front of the van and a special chair for the boy
to sit in as a driver, hand controls, power steering, power brakes,
and other controls recommended by the manufacturer of equipment for
handicapped persons.

(Escobar Depo. exhibit D-1 and exhibits B,

c;

D,

and E of Plaintiff's Complaint).
Mr. Camp pursued the matter through the defendant's internal
appeal procedure and after it was finally denied by the Company at the
highest level, he commenced this action, alleging a breach of his
contract with the insurance company.
The simple issue before this Court is whether or not a speciallyequipped van, prescribed and recommended by his attending physician,
is medical equipment under the terms of the policy.
There are no contested issues of material fact and therefore
Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56, U.R.C.P. was appropriate in this
matter.

It is not disputed that the plaintiff's son is a quadriplegic,

nor can it be disputed that the defendant refused to pay for the van.
Finally, it cannot be disputed that Dr. Escobar, the attending physician
to Jeff Camp, prescribed and recommended that the specially-equipped
van be obtained.
Exhibit "D" attached to plaintiff's complaint is a prescription
for medical equipment.

In that exhibit, Dr. Escobar prescribes a van

with the appropriate special equipment.

In addition, he states in

that prescription that the van is medically necessary.
1n

Furthermore,

his letter (exhibit "B" attached to plaintiff's complaint), Dr.

Sscobar clearly recommends the purchase or rental of the van as
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essential to the patient's health and well being.

In his deposition,

Dr. Escobar states that he prescribed the van for Jeff:
Q.
May I ask just one further question.
Dr.
Escobar, did you prescribe for Jeff Camp a van
equipped with power steering, power brakes,
automatic transmission, refrigeration, hand
control system and automatic wheelchair lift and
a CB radio?
A.
Yes.
I think we went over those and mentioned
the reasons why I had done that.
(Deposition of
Dr. Escobar at page 67)
The specially equipped van is a Type II benefit under plaintiff's
insurance policy with defendant and is covered to 80% of the cost:
Benefits are payable for expenses incurred by you or
your dependents resulting from bodily injury or
accident on the basis of 80% of usual, reasonable and
customary charges for:
MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT - charges for medical
supplies and medical equipment prescribed by a physician,
including oxygen; blood and other fluids to be injected
into the circulatory system; artificial limbs and
eyes; casts, splints, trusses, braces, orthopedic
shoes, crutches, surgical dressings; and rental of
special medical equipment recommended by a physician,
such as a wheelchair, hospital-type bed, iron lung or
oxygen equipment.
(Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiff's complaint
at pages 14 and 15).
(Stewart depo. at 15-16)
(emphasis supplied)
The contract states that DMBA will pay 80% of the expenses
incurred by the injury "resulting from bodily injury or sickness".
One of the expenses detailed are expenses for medical supplies and
equipmen~.

The only requirement for coverage by the company for

medical equipment is

tha~

it be prescribed or recommended by a

physician and it be incurred as a result of a bodlly injury or sick:'
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Here the specially-equipped van was both prescribed and re~ded
as medical equipment for Jeff by the attendinq physician, Dr. Esc~.
Furthermore, the expense of the van directly relates to a bodily
injury incurred by the dependant of the insured.

Accordingly, UDder

the express terms of the policy, the van and its expenses are covered.
Clearly, but for the accident and the subsequent quadriplegic
condition of Jeff Camp, there would have been no need for a speciallyequipped van containing such necessary items for Jeff's condition,
such as hydraulic lift, power steering, hand controls, air conditioning
for his body, power brakes and a CB radio.

Accordingly, such equipment

is necessarily medical equipment, as i t relates solely to Jeff's
condition and injury and is attributable to his medical needs.

As it

was prescribed and recommended by the physician as medical equipment,
the insurer must provide for 80% of its cost pursuant to the terms of
the contract.
ARGU~!ENT

POINT I
THE SPECIALLY-EQUIPPED VAN IS COVEP£D
BY THE EXPRESS TEru1S OF THE CONTRACT
Plaintiff maintains that in order to qualify for benefits under
the terms of the contract, it must show the following:
(a)

The expenses occurred as a result of a bodily injury or

sickness of the insured or dependent of the insured.
(b)

That the medical equipment be prescribed or recommended by a

~hysician.

Plaintiff has met those requirements.

Jeff is the son of the

Pl3in~iff and a dependant under the terms of the policy.

The expense
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of the van was incurred as a result of a bodily injury.

A physician

has prescribed and recol!Ut\ended the van as medical equipment.

There·

fore, the defendant is liable for the cost of the van, failure to~
constitutes a breach of contract.

In the absence of fraud, Dr.

E~~

bar's statement that the van is medical equipment is controlling and
the defendant cannot substitute its own judgment or the judgment of
anyone else for that of Dr. Escobar.
In Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp. , 19 U. 2d 2 9 7 4 3, P. 2C. 130 1:'
this Court faced a similar situation.

There an employee maintained

that he was entitled to total disability benefits under the employer':'
plan.

The employee's physician testified that the employee qualified

for total disability.

The Supreme Court found for the defendant

employer on the basis of the contract language which stated that the
determination of total disability was to be made by a doctor designat:
by the corporation.
totally disabled.)

(That physician stated that the employee was

n~

This Court held that where, in the opinion of the

physician designated by the employer, the employee was not totally
disabled, i t was the duty of the employee to show bad faith,
mistake or the like in order to disqualify that opinion.
to sustain a showing of bad faith, mistake or fraud,

fraud,

Furthermore,

the evidence m~

establish it by "more than a mere preponderance, it must be overw~~
(Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 791
in the

.~icone

(8th Cir. 1940) cited with apo:

case.)

Here, the contract language states that the expe:-~se for medicai
equipment prescribed or recommended bv a physician will be covered t:
the carrier.

Dr. Escobar so ,:nescribed and reco;;c'Tiended, and there:c:

plaintiff
has met its burden.
Defe'>dant ,:ar1nct cor.tc:-adi-::t the opiol.
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of Dr. Escobar as to whether or not someone else views the van as not
being medical equipment.

If the insurer desired, it could have stated

that a physician of its choice would make the determination or that
certain criteria be met.

The defendant failed to do so and is bound by

the language of the contract.
POINT II
INSURANCE CONTRACTS ARE CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE INSURER AND A.J."'BIGUITIES
ARE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF COVERAGE.
It is a fundamental concept of law that insurance contracts are
construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.

Browning

v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 94 Utah 532, 172 P.2d 1060 (1945).
In dealing with insurance contracts there are two theories of
construction:

First, if the terms of the policy are unambiguous,

and second, if the terms of the policy are ambiguous.
In the first instance, if the terms of the policy are clear and
unambiguous, then it must be enforced.

The relevant clause of defen-

dant's contract has been set forth above.

Assuming no ambiguity,

the insurer must pay 80% of the cost of any item of medical equipment
prescribed or recommended by a physician.

In this case, the specially-

equipped van was both prescribed and recommended by the attending
physician, Dr. Escobar, as medical equipment necessary for the
injured patient.

(See Exhibits "B" and "D" of Plaintiff's Complaint).

Furthermore, or. Escobar testified that the van was medical equipment.
Accordingly, the term medical equipment under a strict construction,
~ust

be construed as in the following case:
In that part of the contract which relates to
the "covered" charges for which the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J.
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
provided bythe
the Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
isQuinney
liable,
defendant
employs
word
"equipLibrary Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~ent" _without precise definition.
Implicit
~n th~s use of this work "equipment" is that

the equipment item be diagnosed by his doctor.
The air conditioning unit ordered by plaintiff's
doctor for the purpose of affording plaintiff
relief from his ailment is embraced in the
term "equipment" and therefore plaintiff was
justified in buying the air conditioning unit.
Kennan v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of
the United States, 299 NY Supp. 2d 880, 1969).
The Kennan case was an action to enforce the contract of
insurance for payment of necessary equipment under the medical
insurance policy.

Here the term "equipment" is also used without

precise definition except to limit it to medical equipment, a
modification clearly implicit in the Kennan case as it refers to
equipment ordered by the doctor to relieve an ailment or impairment.
In the case at bar, the specially-equipped van was also ordered
by the doctor to relieve an ailment or impairment.
In fact, the language of the contract says "

. and

rental of special medical equipment recommended by a physician
such as a wheelchair, hospital bed, iron lung or oxygen equipment."
Nowhere does the defendant limit it to those items but rather
states that it will pay for "special medical equipment," i.e.,
equipment not normally required.

~herefore a specially equipped

van for handicapped persons is an item of special medical equipment.
There is no question that the van prescribed and recommended
by Dr. Escobar for Jeff was made necessary as a result of the
injury and therefore, medically necessary to relieve a physical
impairment.

Accordingly, if the term "medical equipment", is

unambiguous it must be any equipl'1ent prescribed and recommended
by a physician =or the ?Urpose

oz

relieving a~ ailment cr impalr-
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ment, and therefore defendant must extend coverage.
Alternatively, if there are two different reasonable interpretations of the term "medical equipment," there must be an ambiguity
in the term "medical equipment" and the following analysis would
apply:
In interpreting an insurance policy, courts have
universally resolved ambiguities, if any there be,
in a policy strictly against the insurer and in
favor of the insured. Christensen v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 21 U.2d 194, 196, 443 P.2d
385 (1968).
The question of ambiguity then is what is "medical equipment"?
In the deposition of Mr. Herwin U. Stewart, Vice President of Deseret
Mutual Benefit Association, Mr. Stewart stated as follows:
A.
All right, Mr. Stewart.
It was on the 14th
then or just prior to the 14th of October, 1976 that
you becane aware of this claim. What was the
substance of your reaction to the claim by Mr. Camp?
A.
I felt that the claim clearly was not an eligible
. . . the claim for a fully equipped van was not an
eligible claim under the policy.
Q.

What was the basis for that judgment?

A.

That it was not medical equipment.

Q.

Why was it not medical equipment?

A.
An automobile is more generally used for something
other than medical.
Hedical equipment would generally
be an item of equipment which is used primarily and
almost exclusively for medical purposes and reasons.
(Deposition at page 11)

Q.
Before I get onto the other items, so what
are you saying then is that instead of just setting
forth a prescription or a recommendation from the
physician, you are requiring other items to be
qiven to you by the insured, is that correct?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A.
Right.
I can think of at least two other
items that would be required:
one is that it be
medical equipment; and t'\-TO, that it be an eligible
expense under the policy.
(Deposition at page 18)

Q. Because if I understand you correctly, are
you telling me that if it is medically necessary
and it is an eligible item of equipment, that it
becomes medical equipment? Is that correct?
A.
If it's specifically listed as an item of medical
equipment, such as a wheelchair or a crutch, there's
nothing further that is required.
If it is not specifically listed, then it must clearly be an item of
medical equipment.
(Deposition at page 19)

Q. Let me just direct the attention to a letter dated
November 5, 1976, from you to me where you state, and
I will quote, and I'll admit I am excerpting out
of the paragraph, but I think it's self-explanatory.
I'm reading now:
"While the committee is sympathetic
with the desirability for adaptation of Jeffrey to
a normal life and to the recommendation of his attending therapist and physicians to retain as much independence as possible, the requested equipment is
considered to be transportation rather than a device
necessary to sustain life or to medically relieve a
physical impairment."
Mr. Bushnell:
Let's finish the other sentence.
Q. All right.
"Such transportation equipment is not
provided for in the medical insurance policy."
Now, are these two other additional items criteria
for determining whether or not it is medical equipment, a device necessary to sustain life or to
medically relieve a physical impairment?
(emphasis
added.)
A.
They would be part of the criteria we would
consider.
(Deposition at pages 25 and 26) (emphasis
added.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

The defendant has not only admitted that the term is ambiguous,
by offering a different definition of medical equipment than plaintiff,
but has placed additional criteria for determining what is medical
equipment.

By the fact that such additional criteria were not set

forth in the contract and insurance agreement they are void and
render defendant's position and reliance upon it unsupportable.
(Fassio v. Montana Physicians' Service, 553 P.2d 998 (Mont.l976)).
At best, defendant has made the term "medical equipment" a floating
term to fit whatever the defendant desires to extend or not extend
coverage to.
If defendant wished to set forth exactly what is medical
equipment and limit it to those items, or establish criteria for
determining what is medical equipment, defendant has an obligation
to do so or to be held strictly to the terms of the policy:
The language of these insurance contracts are
carefully chosen. This was done in the absence
of the Fassios and used to carefully limit and
protect the carrier, Hontana Physicians' Service,
against extended liability.
If Montana Physicians' Service wishes to exclude or limit the
risk contracted for it, then let them do so in
words that leave no doubt.
The law is clear
that in this jurisdiction that exclusion clauses
are construed narrowly against the insurer.
Fassios v. Montana Physicians' Service, 553 P.2d
998, 1, 000 (Montana, 1976).
In that case, as here, defendant is in the position of writing the
terms of the policy.

Plaintiff has had no role in drafting this

document and, should defendant wish to exclude a specially-equipped
van or should it desire to specifically limit the policy coverage to
certain items of medical equipment or establish a criteria for
eli;ibility of "Medical expenses", then it must do so.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In State Farm v. Jacober, 514 P.2d 953

(Cal. 1973), the Califor·

Supreme Court held that when an exclusionary clause is subject to
different reasonable meanings, the insured's view prevails:
For under settled principles so long as coverage is
available under any reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous clause, the insurer cannot escape liability.
. . . so long as there is any other reasonable
interpretation under which recovery would be permitted in the instant case if semantically permissible,
(an insurance) contract will be given such con'r'
struction as will fairly achieve its object of
securing indemnity to the insured to the losses to
which the insurance relates.
Id. at 954, 959.
'
Here, the term "medical equipment" is subject to at least two
different reasonable interpretations:

the plaintiff uses it as any

equipment prescribed or recommended by the physician that is requirea
or necessary for the patient as a result of the injury or condition.'
This is clearly the purpose for which the policy was obtained -- to
insure against any health or medical expense.

But for Jeff's injury,

the specially-equipped van would not be necessary.

Additionally, Dr.

Escobar stated that in his opinion, the van was medically necessary
for Jeff.

(Dr. Escobar's Deposition at Page 66 and prescription,

Exhibit "D" to Plaintiff's Complaint).

As the Utah Supreme Courthas

said:
This jurisdiction, like many others, has declared
in favor of a liberal construction in favor of
the insured to accomplish the purpose for which
the insurance was taken out and the premiums
paid.
Browning, supra at 562.
Defendant, on the other hand, has viewed medical equipment as:
(a)

something :-1ecessary to sustain life,

(Stewart Depo. at 26); (bl

to medically relieve a physical impairmen~
(c)

(Ste•,;art Depo. at 26); s:

something provided in a hospital to patients in a hospital (Ste'{

Depo.
Sponsoredat
by the19).
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r
Under Plaintiff's theory, a specially-equipped van would be an
eligible expense.

In fact, under at least one of defendant's three

theories, the van would qualify.

Defendant states that the item must

be necessary to "medically relieve a physical impairment".

The van

is clearly there to relieve physical impairment, the loss of the
hands, legs and other bodily functions from the neck down of Jeff
Camp.

It is exactly the same function as that of a wheelchair which

defendant admits to cover.
In evaluating this contention, we begin with the
fundamental principle that an insurer cannot
escape its basic duty to insure by means of an
exclusionary clause that is unclear. As we have
declared time and again "any exception to the
performance of the basic underlying obligation
must be so stated as to clearly apprise the
insured of its effects".
[citations omitted)
Thus, the burden rests upon the insurer to place
acceptance and exclusions in clear and unmistakable
language.
[citations omitted)
The exclusionary clause must be conspicuous,
plain and clear.
[emphasis in original]
State Farm Mutual v. Jacober, Id. at 958
Accordingly, defendant has the obligation to set forth its
contract in clear and unambiguous language.

If it does not, then the

insurer must have the policy construed against it.

In this case, as

there is more than one reasonable construction of the term "medical
equipment", the construction of the insured must prevail and the
insurer is liable for the cost of this equipment.
CONCLUSION
We need not go into the subject of the advancement of technology
3~d

modern sc1ence.

We need not deal with the question of whether or
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not a van is the modern replacement of a wheelchair or where this
ends if the insurance company must pay for this van.
We are simply dealing with an insurance contract.

This contract

must be construed according to its terms and strictly against the
insurer in a light most favorable to coverage for the insured.
Defendant's tortured view of the term "medical equipment" is inconsistent with that of the intent of the policy.

That is, to provide

coverage for the insured where, when and if it becomes necessary.
Here, it does.
DATED

this~

day of _l....::ljf..::."'--·+----' 1977.

I --- /_

J .. "/:
THOMAS T. BILLINGS
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

~~ILING

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief to Dan S. Bushnell and Bruce Finclay, of Kirton,
McConkie, Boyer & Boyle, attorneys for defendants-respondents, 336
South Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah
~

84111, postage prepaid this

day of _/_';'1_-...,·1 - - - - - ' 1978.
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